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Abstract 
The external validity of experimental studies and in particular, the subject pool effects have been 
much debated among researchers. The common objections are that the use of student as 
experimental subjects is invalid as they are likely to be unrepresentative. This paper addresses this 
methodological aspect in building economics research. It compares the bidding behavioural 
patterns of experienced construction executives (professionals) and student subjects through 
replication of a bidding experiment that aimed at testing theories. The results show that the 
student subjects’ bidding behavourial patterns, in terms of decision to bid and mark-up decision, 
are sufficiently similar to that of the professionals. This suggests that the subject pool per se is not 
a threat to the external validity of the bidding experiment. In addition, the demonstrated 
practicality of an experimental approach in testing theories should lead to more use of 
experimental studies with student subjects in building economics research. It is suggested that 
experimental and field findings should be seen as complementary in building economics research, 
as advocated in social sciences.     
Keywords: Construction bidding, experiment, external validity, methodological issue. 
Paper type: Research article 
Introduction 
Since the critiques made by Runeson back in 1997 on the importance of theory in construction 
management and economics research (1997a), and on the slow progress in its methodological 
component - in the sense of using what is appropriate from related, well-established disciplines 
(1997b), it seems that there has been little progress on these aspects in the discipline over the last 
two decades. This is evidenced in his most recent review (Runeson and de Valence 2015) in the 
Construction Management and Economics journal with comments on poor standard of current 
research in construction or building economics research.  In their review that focused on 
research on tendering theory and innovations in construction, they cannot emphasize enough the 
importance of using tried and tested theories and methodologies in progressing science in the 
discipline, with one of the key advantages being that appropriate research methods would have 
been established.  This study focuses on the methodological aspect in research on construction 
bidding, which is conventionally referred to as part of building economics. Specifically, it 
examines the external validity of bidding experiments where students were used in place of 
professionals to establish behavioural patterns. This is a commonly used research method in 
social sciences although there are very few examples in construction management. 
Hence, while there is no study specifically on the external validity of experimental studies in 
building economics, the problem has been much debated in the social sciences of which 
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construction management and economics research are parts. By external validity, I refer to the 
ability to generalize results (or behavioural observations) from the laboratory to the non-
laboratory environments (typically called field or real world), i.e., the problem on generalizability 
(Campbell and Stanley 1966). Specifically, it is the ability of a causal relation x = f(y) to be 
generalized over subjects and environments (Frechette 2015). Alm, Bloomquist and McKee 
(2015) referred the subjects and environments as subject pool and context effects, respectively. 
In terms of subject pool effects, a common objection among construction management 
researchers, sometimes echoed by other social scientists is that the use of student as experimental 
subjects is invalid as they are unlikely to be representative of the population that is tested (Falk 
and Heckman 2009). Falk and Heckman (2009) have examined the five most commonly 
mentioned issues related to subject pool effects, namely: (i) stakes or monetary rewards in 
experiments are trivial; (ii) the number of subjects is too small; (iii) subjects are inexperienced; (iv) 
the possibility that subjects behave differently because they perceive that they are observed; and 
(v) the self-selection of subjects may bias results. For context effects, critics refer to the extent to 
which the context in the laboratory decision resembles the context in the field for the same 
decision (Alm, Bloomquist and McKee 2015). This study focusses on the subject pool effects 
with a very precise question: do student subjects behave different to nonstudent subjects in an identical 
construction bidding laboratory experiment? Nonstudent subjects here refer to construction executives 
with experience in bidding. 
To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies that have compared the behavioural patterns in 
construction bidding between student and nonstudent subjects in an experimental setting. 
However, the study on auction theory by Dyer et al. (1989) may be considered as the closest 
work that compared the bidding decisions between construction executives and students in 
common value auctions. In answering the question, this study proposes a direct replication of 
the bidding experiment in Oo (2007) by replacing its nonstudent construction executives 
(professionals) subjects with student subjects. Replication, despite its unpopularity in 
construction management and economics research, has been seen as a key self-correcting force 
(together with peer review) towards ensuring a high standard in research in the discipline 
(Runeson and de Valence 2015). Here, the findings are important for two reasons: (i) because 
they may validate the use of an experimental approach in testing theory, and (ii) because they test 
the applicability of the use of students as experimental subjects. Notably, undergraduate students 
are typical subjects in social science research using experiments, but little is known about their 
use in construction management and economics research.   
Resistance to experimental approach in building economics research 
Before progressing any further, it may be worthwhile to highlight that experiments have been 
remarkably successful in terms of extending, among many other things, the theoretical 
framework for auction theory in economics. Indeed, the use of laboratory experiments in 
economics are common and the first specialty journal - Experimental Economics – was founded in 
1998 (Falk and Heckman 2009). In contrast, the practicability of an experimental approach has 
been demonstrated in a very limited number of papers in construction management and 
economics discipline. For the two well-known journals in the discipline – Construction Management 
and Economics and Journal of Construction Engineering and Management – the fraction of experimental 
studies in relation to all published papers between 1983 and 2015 (with online access) are as low 
as 1% (26 out of 2597) and 3.6% (99 out of 2788), respectively (author’s calculations). Recently, 
however, there is a small collection of experimental studies on construction bidding as presented 
in the next section. Thus, it can be assumed that many researchers in the discipline are still 
reluctant to accept laboratory evidence, as indicated by the overwhelming use of other research 
methods, especially surveys and case studies. This also explains why the debate on the resistance 
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to experimental studies, and in particular the debate on the external validity is absent in the 
discipline. The subsequent review is, thus, based on literature in social sciences that applies to 
building economics research. 
Falk and Heckman (2009) noted that the perceived lack of realism and generalizability have 
caused considerable resistance among social scientists to accept laboratory evidence. However, 
they argued that many recent objections against laboratory experiments are misguided due to a 
misunderstanding of the nature of evidence in science and of the kind of data collected in the 
laboratory, and that more laboratory experiments should be conducted. This argument is 
consistent with the claims of those who argued that many experiments do not have to represent 
the ‘real world’ in any direct way, and that a proper approach to address external validity 
questions that suit the various goals of experimentalists should be developed (e.g., Vissers 2001; 
Guala and Mittone 2005; Schram 2005). In fact, many experiments are aimed at contributing to a 
body of experimental knowledge to be applied case by case, referred as a ‘library of robust 
phenomena’ by Guala and Mittone (2005). Similarly, Camerer (2011) argued that external validity 
is crucial for experimental studies that aim to inform policy, but not for experimental studies 
aiming at understanding general principles, in what he referred to as the policy view and science 
view, respectively. Kessler and Vesterlund (2015), on the other hand, pointed out that the 
resistance to experimental studies has centered on the extent to which the quantitative results 
(e.g., the magnitude of response, the point predictions) are externally valid. They argued that for 
most laboratory studies it is only relevant to ask whether the qualitative results (e.g., the direction 
of response) are externally valid, but not whether an exact quantitative result can be found in 
experimental data. Above all, it is interesting to note that, in defense of external validity, many 
authors have concluded that laboratory and field results are highly complementary, and that both 
are important to the progress of knowledge in social sciences (e.g., Levitt and List 2007, Falk and 
Heckman 2009, Kessler and Vesterlund 2015). 
In terms of subject pool effects, there is a number of studies that specifically compare student 
and nonstudent experimental subjects through replications. There is for example a collection of 
thirteen articles in Frechette (2015) which includes the study by Dyer et al. (1989) and the other 
twelve articles that he loosely classified into four thematic groups: (i) preferences; (ii) market 
experiments; (iii) information signals; and (iv) a miscellaneous group. It should be noted that his 
comparisons were focused on the comparative statistics and qualitative nature of the results 
rather than in tests of point predictions (i.e., in line with Kessler and Vesterlund’s argument). In 
most (9 out of 13), although not in all cases, the comparisons showed no significant difference in 
behaviour between student and nonstudent experimental subjects in a way that would lead us to 
draw different conclusions when testing theories. In another recent study, Alm et al. (2015) 
examined both the subject pool and context effects in laboratory tax compliance experiments. 
Similarly, their results show that the behavioural patterns of student and nonstudent subjects in 
their experiments are sufficiently similar, and in particular, their comparisons were based on 
statistical modelling (or quantitative) results.  
Experimental studies on construction bidding  
According to Roth (1988), laboratory experiments in economics can be classified into three 
categories based on their primary goals: (i) ‘Speaking to Theorists’; (ii) ‘Search for Facts’; and (iii) 
‘Whispering in the Ears of a Prince. Experiments in the first category test hypotheses that have 
been derived from specified models or theories. ‘Search for Facts’ includes experiments that 
examine the effects of variables about which existing theory has little to say. Lastly, the third 
category includes experiments motivated by policy issues. To date, most experiments in building 
economics research, or construction bidding have fallen into the first two categories. For 
examples of experiments with nonstudent (experienced professionals) subjects, Hackemer (1970) 
Construction Economics and Building, 16(1), 64-75  
 
 
Oo  67 
 
examined the effects of variability of estimate, number of competitors and mark-up on bidding 
strategies by asking five competitors to bid for 200 contracts. The experiment, what he referred 
to as ‘simulation’, produced some 200,000 bids via application of different variability factors of 
estimate. In Drew and Skitmore (2006), a bidding experiment was designed to test the 
applicability of Vickery’s revenue equivalence theorem in construction bidding. Perng et al. 
(2006), on the other hand, tested their conceptual model on economically most advantageous 
tender in construction procurement. Next, the bidding experiment in Oo (2007) aimed at testing 
the tenability of bidder homogeneity assumption of tendering theory. 
Turning into examples of experiments with student (inexperienced) subjects, recently, there is a 
series of experiments that aim to test the effect of information feedback on bidders’ 
competitiveness and learning (Soo and Oo 2010, Oo, Abdul-Aziz and Lim 2011, Oo, Ling and 
Soo 2014, 2015). Also, there is an experiment on the effect of construction demand in 
construction bidding (Soo and Oo 2014, Soo 2015). Both the qualitative and quantitative results 
from these studies are consistent with empirical findings based on field data, suggesting that the 
subject pool per se may not be a threat to the external validity of bidding experiments aimed at 
testing theories. However, hitherto, there is no study specifically testing the subject pool effects 
in experimental studies on construction bidding. Oo’s (2007) experiment was selected in this 
study because the author has described all events in detailing the designed bidding experiment 
that make a replication effort possible.  
Research method 
The experiment in the present work is a replication of the bidding experiment in Oo (2007). 
While Oo’s experiments involved 18 and 31 experienced professionals from the Hong Kong 
(HK) and Singapore (SIN) construction industries respectively (hereafter nonstudents 
experiment); the present work involved a group of 24 inexperienced student subjects (hereafter 
students experiment). The student subjects were enrolled in a construction estimating and 
bidding course as part of their construction management undergraduate degree program in a 
tertiary institute in New South Wales (NSW), Australia. Although a small number of the student 
subjects (5 out of 24) were working in the construction industry as revealed in a survey before 
commencing the students experiment, none of them was involved in the bidding decision 
making process of their organizations – the selection criterion for experimental subjects in the 
present work. This justified the inclusion of their responses in the experimental dataset. In 
addition, it should be noted that there were eight international students from Asian countries 
(e.g., China, Singapore, and Myanmar) in the group. Their presence was not engineered for the 
students experiment, and indeed their presence was random and inevitable as all Australian 
universities have comparatively high international student numbers.  Above all, these 
international students were inexperienced subjects, and thus eligible for inclusion in the sample.  
The instruments from the non-students experiment, consisting of an instruction page and a bid 
response form, were used in the students experiment with only one change. That is, to revise the 
descriptions of the twenty hypothetical general building projects using public sector project 
information obtained from the NSW e-tendering website. This was done to localize the project 
descriptions in controlling the effects of extraneous variables, including: (i) contract type; (ii) 
project type; (iii) project location; and (iv) client type. Similar to the nonstudents experiment, the 
hypothetical projects were lump sum contracts for conventional buildings, such as schools and 
institutional buildings located in the Sydney region with the NSW government as project client. 
The unbiased cost estimates given in the bid response form were also expressed in the local 
currency (AUD).  
Replicating the nonstudents experiment, the student subjects were invited to participate in the 
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experiment by (i) acting as senior managers of their construction firms; and (ii) bidding for a total 
of 20 hypothetical projects. For every hypothetical project, there were eight number of bidders’ 
scenarios (ranging from 4 to 30) with the estimated number of competing bidders, N, increasing 
in the levels of 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 18, 24 and 30. With the given project information (location, 
duration, client and contract type) and an unbiased cost estimate for each hypothetical project, 
they were required to decide which project to bid for, and bid up to the bidding scenarios of N 
bidders that they wish to bid by completing the bid response form. The student subjects were 
informed that the lowest bidder would win the job, and that their ultimate aim is to survive and 
prosper. The experiment was arranged in two rounds according to two extreme market 
conditions scenarios, i.e., (i) boom times with low need for work, and (ii) recession times with 
high need for work. The same twenty hypothetical projects were used in both rounds of the 
experiment to establish a strong basis for comparison of results. However, the sequence of the 
projects was randomly revised in the second round in order to avoid contamination of responses. 
It is noted that the findings from the nonstudents experiment have been reported in a number of 
publications (e.g., Oo, Drew and Lo 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b and 2010), examining the 
nonstudent subjects’ decision to bid and their mark-up decisions using different statistical 
modelling techniques (i.e., quantitative results). However, it was necessary to obtain the 
nonstudents experimental dataset from the author for comparing the student and nonstudent 
subjects’ bidding responses in the present work. This is because the focus of the analysis is on 
the comparative statistics and qualitative nature of the results rather than a test of point 
predictions - a principle of analysis adopted from Frechette (2015). To illustrate this principle, 
consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose that the probability of a ‘bid’ decision is 
0.4 for recession scenario, and 0.3 for booming scenario from the student subjects, and that 
similar trend was observed from nonstudent subjects with the recorded probabilities of 0.6 and 
0.45, respectively. Here, the interesting results is the fact that both the student and nonstudent 
subjects recognized the need to submit more bids in “recession with high need for work” as 
reflected by the higher probabilities of a ‘bid’ decision by each group. The conclusion from these 
results is that the findings are robust, and the results are classified as the same for the two groups. 
Even if all the numbers are different between the two groups the qualitative response is the same. 
To be considered different, the two groups should produce results which lead to a different 
interpretation of bidding behavior with respect to the respective theoretical predictions.  
Data sample 
The comparisons between the student and nonstudent subject groups are based on the subjects’ 
decision to bid and mark-up decisions. Appropriate statistical tests for dependent samples or 
matched-pairs (each observation in the booming scenario pairs with an observation in the 
recession scenario) were selected in the respective sections by testing whether the subjects’ 
bidding decisions are statistically different across the market conditions and number of bidders’ 
scenarios. With the adopted principle of analysis, no test was performed to test whether there is 
statistically different between the student and nonstudent subject groups. That is, the focus is on 
the comparative statistics and qualitative results (i.e., the directional effects). Table 1 shows the 
experimental datasets used for the comparisons. It should be noted that the outliers or non-
serious bids have been removed from the analysis on the subject groups’ mark-up decision, 
which is expressed as a percentage above the unbiased cost estimate [MU% = (bidder’s bid - 
unbiased cost estimate) /unbiased cost estimate x 100]. The removal of outliers was based on 
criterion set that include all non-serious bids that are 25% above the individual project unbiased 
cost estimate. 
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Table 1: The experimental datasets 
Experiment Datasets (number of bids) 
 
Booming Recession 
 Bid No-bid Outliers Bid No-bid Outliers 
Decision to bid 
      Students 1921 1919 n.a. 2229 1611 n.a. 
Nonstudents - HK 1290 1590 n.a. 1851 1029 n.a. 
Nonstudents - SIN 1645 3315 n.a. 1915 3044 n.a. 
Mark-up decision 
      Students 1025 1919 896 2012 1611 217 
Nonstudents - HK 1224 1590 66 1851 1029 0 
Nonstudents - SIN 1417 3315 228 1720 3044 196 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the various metrics used to compare the subjects’ decision to bid according to the 
two market conditions. It can be seen that the sample proportions of ‘bid’ decision are higher for 
both subject groups in recession than the booming scenario, providing suggestive evidence of 
their willingness to compete for jobs despite the expected strong competition with fewer jobs are 
available. Although the difference of the sample proportions of ‘bid’ between the two market 
conditions for HK nonstudent subjects (0.20) is higher than the student (0.08) and SIN 
nonstudent (0.06) subject groups, the changes in the willingness to bid in these three subject 
groups are comparable as demonstrated by the respective 95% confidence intervals for the true 
change in probability of a ‘bid’ decision that yield negative values. That is, it is 95% certain that 
the probability of a ‘bid’ decision is lower in booming than the recession scenario.  
 
Table 2:  The experimental subjects' decision to bid according to market conditions  
 Decision to bid metric Experimental subjects 
 Students Nonstudents - HK Nonstudents - SIN 
1 Booming: sample proportions 
of 'bid' decision 
0.50 0.45 0.33 
2 Recession: sample proportions 
of 'bid' decision 
0.58 0.65 0.39 
3 95% CI for true change in 
probability of a 'bid' decision 
(-0.07, -0.09) (-0.18, -0.22) (-0.05, -0.07) 
4 McNemar test p-value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
5 Estimated odds ratio exp (β) in 
logit model 
0.465 0.235 0.481 
6 Odds of a 'bid' decision in 
recession 
2.15 4.26 2.08 
A more critical test of the decision to bid trends involved testing the null hypothesis that the 
probability of a ‘bid’ decision for the booming and recession scenarios is identical. To do this, 
the McNemar test was used to test the matched-pairs and the results are reported as the fourth 
metric in Table 2. The test results for the student and nonstudent groups all yield a p-value less 
than 0.01 providing further strong evidence of increase in willingness to bid during recession, 
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and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. In terms of the relationship between market conditions 
and the probability of a ‘bid’ decision, the estimated odds ratios exp (β) that are not equal to zero 
in the respective logit models (see Oo, Drew and Lo 2008a) show that there is a statistical 
significant relationship between market conditions and number of bids submitted by the student 
and nonstudent groups.  
Taking the student group as an example, the estimated odds ratio exp (β) is found equal to 0.465, 
or equally the odds of a ‘bid’ decision are 2.15 (i.e. 1/0.465) times higher in recession than in 
booming scenario. Despite the use of various metrics in the comparison, it is interesting to note 
that decision to bid trend of the student group is closer to that of SIN nonstudent group. This is 
true for the difference in the sample proportions of ‘bid’ between the two market conditions 
(metrics 1 and 2), metrics 3, 5 and 6. 
 
Table 3: Sample proportions of ‘bid’ according to market conditions and number of bidders 
Experimental 
subjects 
Sample proportions of 'bid'  
No. of bidders  
4 6 8 10 14 18 24 30 
Students         
Booming 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.52 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.34 
Recession 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.42 0.41 
95% CI (.01, -.07) (.00, -.08) (.00, -.08) (-.06, -.14) (-.13, -.22) (-.08, -.17) (-.02, -.11) (-.02, -.10) 
Nonstudents - Hong Kong 
      Booming 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.52 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Recession 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.70 0.61 0.47 0.43 0.43 
95% CI  (-.13, -.04) (-.13, -
.04) 
(-.23, -.13) (-.24, -.12) (-.39, -.27) (-.30, -.19) (-.28, -.17) (-.28, -.17) 
Nonstudents - Singapore 
      Booming 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.42 0.31 0.15 0.11 0.11 
Recession 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.45 0.38 0.27 0.18 0.16 
95% CI  (-.08, .03) (-.07, .04) ( -.10, .01) (-.09, .02) (-.12, -.01) (-.17, -.08) (-.11, -.03) (-.09, -.01) 
Any pairs with italicized sample proportions of 'bid' indicate the difference in probability of 'bid' between the two market 
conditions is statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
Table 3 summarizes the subject groups’ sample proportions of ‘bid’ according to the two market 
conditions and number of bidders, N. The student subjects’ sample proportions of ‘bid’ decrease 
as the number of bidders increase for both the booming and recession scenarios, consistent with 
that of both the HK and SIN nonstudent groups. In considering the difference of probability of 
a ‘bid’ decision between the two market conditions, the results from the McNemar test show 
that the respective probabilities of the student group are statistically significant (p < 0.01) when 
number of bidders is considered large (N ≥ 10). Interestingly, a similar trend was detected 
among the SIN nonstudent group when N ≥ 8. However, it can be seen that the sample 
proportions of ‘bid’ when N is considered small for both the student and SIN nonstudent 
groups are still higher in recession than in the booming scenario, although there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis in these particular scenarios. In terms of true change in 
probability of a ‘bid’ decision, the trend for the student group is again similar to that of SIN 
nonstudent group. Here, the probability of a ‘bid’ decision may be higher in booming than 
recession when N is considered small (students: N ≤ 8; SIN nonstudents: N ≤ 10) as reflected in 
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the upper 95% confidence intervals which contain some positive values (students: from -8 to 1%; 
SIN nonstudents: -10 to 4%).      
It is noted that a rather different decreasing trend of sample proportions of 'bid' was observed 
for HK nonstudent group, where the probability of a ‘bid’ decision between the two market 
conditions  is statistically significant (p < 0.01) for all the number of bidders’ scenarios. Also, the 
probability of a ‘bid’ decision of HK nonstudent group in booming is lower than recession for all 
the number of bidders’ scenarios with all negative values recorded in the 95% confidence 
intervals. Nonetheless, the decreasing decision to bid trends as the number of bidders increase 
for both the market conditions’ scenarios are consistent among the student and nonstudent 
groups as clearly illustrated in Figure 1, in which a second order quadratic regression form is 
found to be the curve of best fit for all six decreasing trends  (R2 values above 0.9). The best-fit 
trend lines further demonstrate that the decision to bid trend of the student group is closer to 
that of SIN nonstudent group when the sample proportions of 'bid' were considered according 
to market conditions and number of bidders, consistent with the metrics in Table 2.  
Figure 1: Decision to bid trends of the experimental subjects according to market conditions and 
number of bidders 
 
Turning into the experimental subjects’ mark-up decision, Table 4 shows the various metrics 
used to compare their mark-up decision according to the two market conditions. Although the 
percentage of serious bids from the student group is considerably lower in the booming scenario 
compared to the HK and SIN nonstudent groups, this observation is explainable by the fact that 
there are different motives for submitting non-serious bids among bidders as identified in the 
literature (e.g., Drew 1994, Collins and Pasquire 1996). The percentages of serious bids from 
both the student and nonstudent groups in the recession scenario, on the other hand, are close 
to each other, and suggest that they recognize the need to bid competitively in order to win jobs.  
In terms of the subjects' mark-up size, the mean percentage mark-up as most commonly used 
measure of central tendency might be of more interest to the readers, but it is influenced by 
extreme values (i.e., exceptional low and high mark-ups) in the respective datasets. For example, 
the minimum mark-up sizes recorded for HK and SIN nonstudent groups in recession are as 
low as around -20% (i.e. a mark-down strategy). In this case, the median is the appropriate 
Recession, Nonstuds SIN, R2 = 0.9826 
Booming, Nonstuds HK, R2 = 0.9601 
Booming, Studs SIN, R2 = 0.964 
Recession, Nonstuds HK, R2 = 0.9479 
Recession, Studs, R2 = 0.9904 
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central tendency measure (the mean measure is still included in Table 4 for reference). It can be 
seen that the median percentage mark-ups for both the student and nonstudent groups are close 
to each other in the booming scenario (i.e., 8 to 10%). Their median percentage mark-ups in the 
recession scenario, on the other hand, are rather varied from around 1 to 7%. Although the 
median measure does not alter when there are extreme values in a dataset, the varied median 
percentage mark-ups can partly be explained by the high occurrences of negative mark-ups for 
both the HK and SIN nonstudent groups as indicated by the recorded minimum mark-up sizes. 
A further examination on the datasets based on the mode does reveal that both the student and 
nonstudent subjects’ mark-up are dominated by zero (HK) and positive mark-ups (i.e., 5% for 
student and SIN nonstudent group). Here, both the median and mode measures suggest that 
student and nonstudent experimental subjects were all sensible in their mark-up decision and 
aiming to make a profit or at least to breakeven.  
 
Table 4: The experimental subjects' mark-up decision according to market conditions 
Mark-up decision metric Experimental subjects 
Students 




% of serious bids: 
booming vs. recession 
53% vs. 90% 95% vs. 100% 86% vs. 90% 
Booming: MU%     
mean (std. dev.) 10.38 (5.98) 8.53 (6.71) 9.36 (6.71) 
median 9.09 8.00 10.00 
mode 10.00 0.00 15.00 
minimum -5.00 -10.00 -7.50 
maximum 25.00 24.91 25.00 
Recession: MU%  
   mean (std. dev.) 8.98 (6.36) 0.67 (6.10) 3.08 (5.58) 
median 7.27 1.25 3.00 
mode 5.00 0.00 5.00 
minimum -5.00 -19.64 -20.00 
maximum 25.00 21.05 20.62 
Skillings-Mack test p-value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
Next, the analysis aimed to test if there is a statistical difference in percentage mark-ups between 
the two market conditions for each individual subject groups, using a Skillings-Mack test. The 
Skillings–Mack statistic is a general Friedman-type statistic that can be used in almost any block 
design with an arbitrary missing-data structure. In this case, the number of bids in each market 
conditions scenario is different (i.e., there are missing data), which is considered as an 
unbalanced incomplete block design (see Skillings and Mack, 1981). As shown as the last metric 
in Table 4, the results show that there is a statistically significant difference in percentage mark-
ups between the two market conditions, with higher mark-ups in booming  than in recession, for 
both the student and nonstudent subject groups at p < 0.01 level. Combining the test results with 
the central tendency measure, it is therefore concluded that the mark-up behaviour of the 
student and nonstudent subject groups are comparable, and so are their decision to bid 
behaviour.  
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Discussion 
Consistent with the findings in Dyer et al. (1989), the student group in the present work has 
demonstrated a bidding behavioural pattern similar to the HK and SIN nonstudent groups. It is 
evident that both the student and nonstudent groups exhibited sufficiently similar decision to bid 
and mark-up trends, including: (i) the higher number of bidding attempts in recession than in 
booming market conditions; (ii) the decreasing number of bidding attempts as the number of 
competing bidders increase; (iii) the strategy to apply negative mark-ups in order to win jobs; and 
(iv) the higher number of serious and competitive bids with lower mark-ups in recession than in 
booming market conditions. These bidding trends are, in fact, similar to that of empirical 
findings based on field data as reported in a number of publications on the nonstudent groups 
resulted from Oo’s (2007) experiment. Although these trends do, to some extent, address the 
threat to the external validity of the bidding experiment in terms of context effects, the main 
focus here is on the subject pool effects. Specifically, in answering the question: do student subjects 
behave different to nonstudent subjects in an identical construction bidding laboratory experiment? the results 
suggest that the subject pool per se is not a threat to the external validity of the experiment. While 
there is no similar work that examines the subject pool effects in experimental studies of 
construction bidding, the results in the present work are comforting and plausible. The 
implication here is that those considering similar studies in future could use student subjects in 
their experiments, especially since empirical analyses of bidding behaviour using field data are 
limited by the difficulty of obtaining data. However, such use depends largely upon the purpose 
of an experiment. In addition, the sample selections and analytical methods are important in 
order to give credibility to reported results (Runeson and de Valence 2015).         
Another important implication is that the results address the concern on the effect of monetary 
incentives in experimental studies as noted in the literature. It is worth noting that there is no 
monetary incentive in any of these experiments, students or nonstudents. Both subject groups 
were only offered a copy of the findings in return for their participation. Nonetheless, the results 
suggest that the student subjects engaged in the experiment seriously, with behavioural patterns 
that are similar to the nonstudent subjects. Again, this does not mean that there is no need for 
studies in future to decide on whether or not to introduce monetary incentives in experimental 
designs. Although offering payoffs to experimental subjects based on subjects’ performance is 
common for experiment studies in economics (see Lee (2007) for a comprehensive review), one 
should note that it is difficult to decide on the comparable payoffs to both student and 
nonstudent subjects (Frechette 2015).  
In summary, the reported results demonstrate the practicality of using experimental approaches 
in testing theory in building economics. In addition, they suggest that the use of student subjects 
in experiments in the area of construction bidding should not be seen as a threat to the external 
validity of the experiments. This is further supported by some recent bidding experiments that 
used student subjects, and have reported robust findings as highlighted in the above review. 
However, it is not the intention here to argue that experimental dataset can be used to provide 
quantitative results such as point estimates. Here, the reported qualitative results allow one to 
safely predict bidding behavioural patterns that would arise in the field. Indeed, as contended by 
Kessler and Vesterlund (2015), there is significantly less (and possibly no) disagreement among 
researchers on the extent to which the qualitative results of an experimental study are externally 
valid. 
Conclusion 
The main conclusion from this replication effort is that the use of student subjects should not 
been seen as a threat to the external validity of standard experiments on construction bidding 
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aimed to test theories. With no similar study in the literature, the findings are important, as they 
address the common concerns of most researchers on the practicality of using student subjects 
in building economics experiments. It is recognized that the stakes are obviously smaller in an 
experimental setting, and the decision settings are unavoidably less rich, but the findings should 
lead to more confidence in the use of experimental approaches in future studies. Indeed, causal 
knowledge requires controlled variations, and this can only be achieved via active manipulation 
of variables in an experimental setting. It is suggested that experimental and field findings should 
be seen as complementary in building economics research, as advocated in other social sciences. 
Lastly, peer reviewers should obviously question the relevance of an experimental approach for 
the phenomena being investigated, but not reject papers on the grounds only that use 
experiments. As with other approaches, they need to consider the various goals of researcher and 
how they may be best achieved without violating the external validity of the results.  
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